Animal waste from Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) is a significant 5 contributor to nitrate contamination of groundwater. To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of 6 alternative policies for controlling nitrate pollution at the field and farm level, this article 7 implements a structural dynamic model of a representative CAFO. The model accounts for herd 8 management, manure handling systems, crop rotations, water sources, irrigation systems, waste 9 disposal options, and pollutant emissions. Results show that the standard approach of limiting the 10 amount of animal waste that may be applied to fields reduces net farm income by more than 25% 11 whereas the most cost-effective emission-based policies reduce income only marginally. This 12 motivates greater consideration for nonpoint source pollution control policies that target 13 estimated emissions. Furthermore price instruments are shown to slightly outperform quantity 14 instruments under conditions that are typical of CAFOs. The results also show that adoption of 15 alternative technologies and practices is crucial for cost-effective abatement, and demonstrate the 16 importance of accounting for the spatial heterogeneity of both irrigation water and salinity when 17 designing policy mechanisms for nitrate pollution control. 18
2 population roughly doubled, while the number of domestic animals tripled (FAO 2003) . In the 24 U.S., the national average stocking density for dairy operations increased from 57 to 139 head 25 per farm from 1992 to 2009 (USDA 2010) . The situation is particularly noticeable in California. 26
California has been the nation's leading dairy state since 1993. As of 2009, the average size of a 27 dairy herd in the state was 1055 cows, much higher than the national average level (CDFA 28 2010) . For Kern County, one of the five leading dairy counties in the state, the average number 29 of cows in a dairy operation is up to 3190 (CDFA 2010) . Higher farm incomes due to economies 30 of scale will likely sustain the trend toward larger and more concentrated animal feeding 31 operations (CAFOs). 32
Another significant and concurrent change throughout the world has been land use 33 transformation. For the U.S. agricultural sector specifically, changes have taken place in 34 cropping patterns with the total amount of crop land relatively stable (Lubowski et al. 2006) . In 35 California, more than 1.2 million acres of land for field crops has been converted to vineyards, 36 vegetables, and orchards in the past three decades (Cooley et al. 2009 ). Consolidation combined 37 with the deceasing acreage for field crops lead to less land available for animal waste disposal. In 38 addition, animal waste, especially dairy and swine manure, is costly to move relative to its 39 nutrient value. Therefore, the common practice of operators continues to be over-application of 40 animal waste on land close to the facility. Excess nutrients transported off the farm can produce 41 adverse environmental and health effects. 42
Nitrogen and phosphorus emissions from CAFOs have received considerable attention from 43 regulators. Either nutrient can accelerate algae production in receiving aquatic ecosystems 44 leading to potentially large algal blooms and a variety of problems including clogged pipelines, 45 fish kills, and reduced recreational opportunities (USEPA 2000) . Furthermore, nitrate-nitrogen in3 groundwater is a potential threat to public health. Two medical conditions have been linked to8 where η is the discount rate. The net income from herd production ( is equal to the 156 revenue from milk and meat production less the total production cost. These revenues and costs 157 are largely determined by the herd size which, along with certain farm and waste management 158 practices, also determines the amount and content of waste produced. An important waste 159 management decision that we explicitly model is the type of manure handling system used on the 160 farm. Two common manure handling systems are considered in this study: flush-lagoon and 161 scrape-tank. The scrape-tank system is more labor and capital intensive but uses much less water 162
per cow compared to the flush-lagoon system and thus produces a smaller volume of waste. The 163 two also differ in the method of on-site waste spreading. Under the flush-lagoon system, 164
wastewater shares the same pipelines with irrigation systems. Therefore, non-uniformity of an 165 irrigation system determines the non-uniform land application of animal waste. Under the 166 scrape-tank system, waste is transported and spread to land via tractors so presumably it can be 167 uniformly applied over the field. Currently the flush-lagoon system is used in about two-thirds of 168 all California dairies and typically employed in the Central Valley (Hurley et al. 2007 ). For each 169 system, the waste management component of the objective function ( accounts for the 170 revenues that can be earned from selling dried solid waste and the cost of transporting excess 171 liquid waste off-site. 172
The net income from crop production ( ) equals gross returns less both fixed and 173 variable costs. The fixed production costs include operating costs such as seed, herbicide, labor, 174 and machinery but not overhead costs. The variable costs include irrigation and fertilizer costs. 175 Improved irrigation uniformity has been shown to be a promising method of cost reduction under 176 environmental regulations. Therefore we explicitly consider irrigation system choice and the 177 effects of system non-uniformity on crop production and nitrate leaching. We also account for9 the combined effects of water, nitrogen, and salinity on crop growth and leaching using functions 179 developed by Wang and Baerenklau (2014b) . 180
The remaining terms in the objective function account for incentive-based policy costs 181 ( ), when applicable, and the salvage value of the herd ( ). The objective function is 182 maximized subject to transition equations, mass balance requirements, non-negativity 183 constraints, herd permit limits, and command-and-control policy constraints, when applicable. 184
The model has a total of ten state variables: one for herd size and nine describing three soil 185 characteristics (soil organic nitrogen, soil inorganic nitrogen, and soil salinity) across three types 186 of field subareas. As described in the appendix, we use these types to account for irrigation 187 system non-uniformity by modeling the cropped area as though it is comprised of three distinct 188 sub-areas: one area receives less than the average amount of applied water (under-irrigated 189 subfield), one receives the average amount (mean-irrigated subfield), and one receives more than 190 the average (over-irrigated subfield). 191
Currently the stochastic nature of parameters such as milk and crop prices are not included in 192 the model, so rather than set up the problem in a dynamic programming framework, we treat it as 193 a constrained non-linear programming problem due to the high dimensionality. The model has 194 three discrete choice variables: manure handling system M, irrigation system I, and crop rotation 195 R. For simplicity and tractability, we assume the operator commits to a manure handling system, 196 irrigation system, and crop rotation at the beginning of the planning horizon without the 197 possibility of switching in the future. We are interested in two manure handling systems 198 (flush-lagoon and scrape-tank), two irrigation systems (1/4-mile furrow and linear move system), 199 and six patterns of crop rotation (corn or alfalfa for summer; wheat, oat, or triticale for winter), 200 resulting in a total of 24 alternative combinations of discrete management practices (hereafter 201 10 referred to as alternative activity sets A1,…,A24). For example, the activity set A1 would be 202 flush-lagoon, 1/4-mile furrow, and corn-wheat rotation. Conditional on an activity set, the 203 operator determines the optimal number of cows to buy or sell, and the optimal amounts of liquid 204 animal waste, solid animal waste, surface water, deep groundwater, shallow groundwater and 205 commercial fertilizers to apply during each season of each year of the planning period. Solving 206 the optimization problem similarly for each possible activity set identifies the set that maximizes 207 net farm income (in the following sections we denote the activity set associated with the optimal 208 solution as "the optimal activity set"). 209
Baseline Simulation 210
The planning horizon is 30 years (i.e., 60 seasons). All the simulated scenarios can reach a 211 steady state over the first 24 years, with boundary effects for some scenarios in the last 6 years 2 . 212 Therefore, the following analyses are based on the results of the first 24 years. All revenues and 213 costs are reported in 2005 dollars. With no environmental regulations in the baseline scenario, the operator optimally selects 216 flush-lagoon as the manure handling system, 1/4-mile furrow as the irrigation system, and 217 corn-wheat as the crop rotation. Animal numbers are similar to those at the study site, with 218 differences due to off-farm rearing of calves and heifers. The herd size also remains steady 219 through time, constrained by the herd permit. Annual income per cow is higher than the 220 comparison source due to different assumptions about milk production per cow in different areas 221 of the country. The field emission of nitrogen is low compared to the study site, which is 222 probably because we assume a deeper root zone of 3 meters. 3 In summary, our model appears to 223 be calibrated well. 224
It is also worth noting that the operator does not apply commercial fertilizer or solid waste on 225 site in the baseline scenario. In reality, farmers are usually concerned about certain risks 226 associated with manure fertilizer, such as pathogens and weeds and the fact that organic nitrogen 227
is not immediately plant-available. Therefore they also use some commercial fertilizer. This is 228 why we see the difference between our simulated value and the comparison value for applied 229 fertilizer in Table 1 . We do not consider these issues for the dairy operator but for surrounding 230 land owners we use three levels of WTAM (20%, 60%, and 100%) to account for these concerns 231 and perform sensitivity analysis. The policy simulations presented below are for the WTAM 232 level of 60%. Figures 2(a)-2(c) display the optimal paths of soil organic nitrogen, soil inorganic 233 nitrogen, and soil salinity, which vary depending on the field type. The level of soil organic 234 nitrogen is highest in the over-irrigated subfield and lowest in the under-irrigated subfield, while 235 the level of soil salinity is lowest in the over-irrigated subfield and highest in the under-irrigated 236 subfield. This is because the concentration of inorganic nitrogen is much higher than the 237 concentration of salts in animal waste. Meanwhile, the amount of nitrates and salts that can be 238 carried through the soil is limited during each irrigation and thus during the whole season. 239 Therefore, leaching significantly affects the total amount of salts in soil but not the total amount 240 of inorganic nitrogen. More nitrogen accumulates in the subfield that receives more animal 241 waste, and more salts accumulate in the subfield that receives less irrigation water. The optimal 242 decision rule for seasonal irrigation, as shown in figure 2(d), suggests that in order to maintain a 243 12 relatively stable level of salinity, the operator periodically applies large volumes of high quality 244 water to flush the salts out of the soil. This leads to the cyclical patterns in the paths of soil 245 inorganic nitrogen and soil salinity. We do not see a similar pattern for soil organic nitrogen, 246 since water is the transporting medium of dissolved salts (including inorganic nitrogen) but not 247 organic nitrogen. 248 Table 2 summarizes the total available water, crop relative yield, and field emission of 256 nitrogen for each field type over the planning horizon. Although flushing significantly increases 257 the leaching for the mean-irrigated subfield, the main contributor to field emissions is the 258 over-irrigated subfield, due to the high non-uniformity of the 1/4-mile furrow system. The 259 over-irrigated field type makes up only 18% of the field, receives only 31% of total irrigation, 260 produces only 20% of total crop yield, but accounts for 77% of total field emission of nitrogen. 261
To further illustrate the effects of non-uniform irrigation, we report similar information in 262 table 3 from the optimization results under an alternative activity set where the linear move 263 system is adopted instead of furrow. Compared to the baseline scenario, the amount of applied 264 water decreases by 6%, but the total relative yield increases by 3% and the total amount of 265 nitrogen field emission decreases by 46%. With the linear move irrigation system, the operator 266 13 no longer periodically applies large volumes of high quality water. The linear move system is 267 more uniform than the furrow system and thus can maintain the soil salinity at acceptable levels 268 without flushing. Therefore, the amount of nitrate emitted from the mean-irrigated subfield is 269 greatly reduced from 865.55 kgN/ha to 44.97 kgN/ha, a 95% decrease. Also, nitrate leaching 270 from the over-irrigated subfield decreases by 31% because of the improved uniformity of water 271 and waste distribution (refer to Appendix figure A2.1). However the net farm income is lower 272 under this activity set due to the higher cost of the linear move system. This implies that a 273 relatively simple policy of subsidizing more uniform irrigation systems might be able to achieve 274 a substantial reduction in field emissions, which suggests that elements of cost-sharing and 275 technical assistance should be part of the policy discussion. 276
A switch from the flush-lagoon system to the scrape-tank system can also effectively reduce 277 nitrate leaching, but through different mechanisms (refer to Appendix figure A2.2). As 278 previously discussed, animal waste collected through the scrape-tank system is uniformly spread 279 over the field using tractors while irrigation water is not. Therefore, under this alternative activity 280 set, the over-irrigated subfield has the smallest amount of both nitrogen and salts in soil because 281 it has the highest level of leaching. For the same reasons, the steady state level of soil salinity for 282 the over-irrigated subfield is lower than that under the baseline scenario. Similarly, the steady 283 state level of soil salinity for the under-irrigated subfield is higher than that under the baseline 284 scenario. As shown in table 4, compared to the baseline scenario, the amount of nitrate leaching 285 from the over-irrigated subfield significantly decreases under this alternative waste management 286 activity. The mean-irrigated subfield now contributes over 40% of the total amount of nitrate 287 leaching, which suggests that salt flushing has significant effects on nitrate leaching under 288 uniform fertilizer application and non-uniform irrigation. For the whole field, the amount of 289 14 applied water, the total relative yield, and the total field emissions decrease by 2%, 0.5% and 290 33% respectively, compared to the baseline scenario. Again, the net farm income is lower under 291 this activity due to the higher cost of the scrape-tank system, but a policy that subsidizes 292 water-saving manure collecting systems and/or more uniform waste distribution systems might 293 also be able to achieve a substantial reduction in field emissions. 294
Policy Simulations 295
We simulate five alternative policy scenarios: nutrient management plan (NMP), field 296 emission limit (FEL), field emission charge (FEC), downstream emission limit (DEL), and 297 downstream emission charge (DEC). NMP is a quantity restriction on a polluting input. FEL and 298 FEC are, respectively, a quantity restriction and an emission charge on the intermediate pollution 299
(i.e., nitrates leached to groundwater that has not yet migrated off-site), while DEL and DEC are, 300 respectively, a quantity restriction and an emission charge on the final pollution (i.e., nitrates in 301 groundwater that migrates off-site and enters the ecosystem). 302
The policy simulations are designed to quantify the inefficiency of NMP compared to 303 emission-based policies and to investigate the relative cost-effectiveness of price versus quantity 304 mechanisms. Therefore we use the field and downstream emissions from the optimal activity set 305 under NMP as reference points, and adjust the emission limits and charges under the FEL and 306 FEC so that they achieve the same level of field emissions (and downstream emissions) as under 307 NMP. Similarly, we adjust the emission limits and charges under the DEL and DEC to achieve 308 the same downstream level of nitrogen loading as under NMP. Reductions in net farm income 309 are then compared. For each policy simulation, we assume the operation is initially at the steady 310 state derived from the baseline scenario and then solve for the dynamically optimal practices 311 under each policy. 312
Nutrient Management Plan 313
NMPs are included in the model as constraints on seasonal applications of inorganic nitrogen. 314
We construct the constraints to be consistent with the NMP requirement in the published General 315
Order: the sum of nitrogen from applied animal waste (inorganic nitrogen plus the amount of 316 organic nitrogen that is mineralized during that season), fertilizers, irrigation water, and 317 atmospheric deposition must be no greater than 1.4 times the agronomic uptake rate (CRWQCB 318 2007) . 319
Under the NMP scenario, the operator optimally selects scrape-tank as the manure handling 320 system, 1/4-mile furrow as the irrigation system, and corn-wheat as the crop rotation under the 321 NMP scenario. Due to the NMP constraint, the operator hauls almost half of the liquid waste off 322 site. As shown in figures 3(a)-3(c), this results in significant decreases in soil organic nitrogen 323 and soil inorganic nitrogen, and moderate decreases in soil salinity, for the mean-and 324 over-irrigated subfields compared to the baseline scenario in figure 2. Another change in the 325 management practices is the irrigation pattern ( figure 3(d) ). Although the total amount of surface 326 water applied over the planning horizon increases little, the water is smoothly applied without 327 flushing. This is why the soil salinity of the under-irrigated subfield remains high. Compared to 328 the baseline scenario, both the field emission and the downstream emission of nitrogen (figures 329 3(e) and 3(f)) decrease by 84.1% under NMP. Total crop revenue increases by 6.2% but the 330 operator still suffers a heavy net income loss of 27.4%, primarily due to the high cost of offsite 331 waste hauling. 332
Field Emission Limit 333
Under the NMP scenario, the total amount of field emissions over the 24 year horizon is 334 604.2 kgN/ha, or approximately 25.2 kgN/ha per year. We therefore set this as the annual field 335 emissions limit.
336
The optimal activities under the FEL scenario are flush-lagoon as the manure handling 337 system, linear move as the irrigation system, and corn-wheat as the crop rotation. Figure 4  338 displays the main results. Unlike under the NMP scenario, the operator does not transport any 339 liquid waste off site with a field emission limit. Instead, the operator controls the rate of field 340 emission by applying less irrigation water and thus holding a large pool of nitrogen in the soil 341 (figures 4(a) and 4(b)). Denitrification in the unsaturated zone can transform the total available 342 inorganic nitrogen into nitrogen gas at a rate of λ k , which is a fixed parameter in the model. If 343 more inorganic nitrogen remains in the soil over the season, more becomes nitrogen gas and less 344 nitrate is leached. Therefore, rather than leaching nitrate and salt into the aquifer, the operator 345 takes advantage of the natural denitrification processes to reduce field emissions.
346
The reduction in irrigation mainly happens in summer, since the winter crop is more 347 salt-tolerant and, under the baseline scenario, the field emission from summer cropping is five 348 times greater than that from winter cropping. Less irrigation leads to higher levels of soil salinity 349 in the subfields (figure 4(c)), which can reduce crop yields. Flushing is again absent from the 350 irrigation schedule ( figure 4(d) ) and, by construction, field and downstream emissions ( figure  351 4(e) and 4(f)) are the same as those under NMP. However, compared to the baseline scenario, net 352 farm income decreases by only 0.79%, with 7.20% of crop yields sacrificed to meet the field 353 emission standard. This implies that quantity control of intermediate pollution is much more 354 cost-effective than quantity control of polluting inputs for the case of nitrogen emissions. 355
Field Emission Charge 356
A per-unit effluent charge also could be applied to estimated field emissions. For each activity 357 set, we derive the field emission charge that would produce the same amount of field emissions 358 as the NMP and FEL scenarios. A lump-sum return of emission charges does not alter marginal 359 conditions in our model, and thus does not affect the optimal activities for a given scenario. At 360 an emission charge of $2.50/kgN/ha, the operator achieves the same level of emission reduction 361 at a net income loss of 0.79%. The optimal activity set and other management practices are the 362 same as that under the field emission limit. 363
Downstream Emission Limit 364
The total amount of downstream emissions over the 24 year horizon under both NMP and FEL 365 is 495.4 kgN/ha, or approximately 20.6 kgN/ha per year. 6 We therefore set this as the annual 366 limit on downstream emissions. 367
The optimal activities under the downstream emission limit scenario are the same as those 368 under the baseline scenario. As shown in figure 5 , the paths for soil organic nitrogen, soil 369 inorganic nitrogen, and soil salinity (figures 5(a)-5(c)) are similar to those under FEL. The most 370 dramatic change in management practices is that the operator now recycles shallow groundwater 371 18 (low quality drainage water) and imports less surface water ( figure 5(d) This demonstrates one advantage of an emission charge over an emissions limit when seasonal or 396 annual emissions fluctuate either due to operating practices (i.e., different seasonal crops in 397 rotation) or the cyclical accumulation of precursors to the pollution (i.e., soil inorganic nitrogen). 398
However in this case the effect is relatively small. 399 Table 5 summarizes the policy simulation results under four sets of activities. 7 The optimal 401 activity sets (i.e., smallest net income loss) for NMP, FEL, FEC, DEL, and DEC are respectively 402 A3, A2, A1, A1, and A1, and the associated losses are respectively 27.40%, 0.79%, 0.72%, 403 0.74%, and 0.70% of net farm income. The policies targeting downstream emissions are slightly 404 more cost-effective than the policies targeting field emissions, and price mechanisms (emission 405 charges) are slightly more cost-effective than quantity controls. Regardless all emission-based 406 policies are substantially more cost-effective than NMP which targets nitrogen input. 407
Summary of Results 400
The field emission charge is an interesting case. From the regulator's perspective, the most 408 cost-effective outcome under FEC is a net income loss of 0.72%, which is lower than that under 409 FEL. However, this outcome is attainable only when there is a single farm type and given the 410 following sequence of action: the operators move first by adopting a combination of activities, 411 then the regulator sets the charge rate accordingly, and then the charge revenue is lump-sum 412 returned. Amacher and Malik (1998) develop a theoretical model to compare outcomes with an 413 emission tax and an emission standard in a cooperative bargaining framework. One of the 414 22 In addition, and consistent with previous studies (e.g., Schwabe, 2001) , our approach 459 demonstrates that ecosystem services (here, subsurface denitrification) can play an important role 460 in achieving cost-effective pollution control and thus deserve more attention when designing 461 policies. We also show that optimal technologies and management practices (e.g., waste disposal 462 methods, irrigation system, manure handling system, irrigation pattern, and shallow groundwater 463 recycling) vary across nitrate control policies and moreover can significantly reduce compliance 464 costs. For all of our emission-based policies, optimal technology and management choices 465 reduce compliance costs by roughly 60-90% relative to NMPs (Table 5 ). This underscores the 466 need to incorporate such choices into policy simulation models, and also suggests that elements 467 of cost-sharing, technical assistance, and R&D funding should be part of the policy discussion. 468
Furthermore we demonstrate the importance of accounting for salinity effects in the debate about 469 nitrogen. We do this by implementing crop response functions that integrate the effects of 470 available water, available nitrogen, and exposed salinity. These relationships, combined with 471 field-level heterogeneity and soil nitrogen transformations, are shown to significantly affect both 472 the pattern and quantity of nitrate emissions under alternative policies. Modeling of both 473 temporal and spatial dynamics of soil characteristics is necessary to account for these factors and 474 thus should be incorporated in future research. 475 Some additional caveats to consider when interpreting our results include the following. First 476 is the assumption that liquid animal waste shares the same distribution system as irrigation water 477 under the flush-lagoon system. However, in practice, liquid animal waste typically is less 478 uniformly applied than irrigation water since it likely enters the system at a single point whereas 479
irrigation water enters at multiple points. It would be desirable to model the different 480 non-uniform distributions of animal waste and irrigation water but we lack the information to do 481 23 this here. Second, our results are based on a deterministic optimization model. A future extension 482 with stochastic components (e.g., prices, weather) could provide an improved assessment. Third, 483
we do not consider the potential cross-media effects of nitrate regulations. Baerenklau et al. 484 (2008) show that these could be substantial for the case of transferring nitrate to ammonia when 485 groundwater emissions are regulated but air emissions are not. Neither that study nor this one 486 considers the potential costs associated with increased nitrous oxide emissions. Ideally the social 487
costs associated with such policy-induced cross-media emissions should be incorporated into the 488 policy analysis. Fourth, our model is based on a single representative dairy farm. A future 489 extension would be to investigate impacts of alternative policies at the regional level. Last, we do 490 not consider long-run industry-level effects such as entry/exit incentives that can differ across 491 policy mechanisms. Given the ongoing migration of large dairy farms both within and beyond 492
California's borders, this would seem to be a fruitful topic for further study. 493 3.42% 1.61% 9.00% 9.54% FEC 0.72% 0.79% 8.88% 9.45% DEL 0.74% 0.79% 8.88% 9.45% DEC b 1.00% 1.27% 9.00% 9.54% DEC 0.70% 0.79% 8.88% 9.45% a A1: flush-lagoon, 1/4-mile furrow, corn-wheat rotation; A2: flush-lagoon, linear move, corn-wheat rotation; A3: scrape-tank, 1/4-mile furrow, corn-wheat rotation; A4: scrape-tank, linear move, corn-wheat rotation. b No lump-sum return of emission charge 
